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Abstract
Macro news can a⁄ect currency prices directly, and indirectly via order ￿ ow. Past research shows that the
direct e⁄ects of scheduled macro news account for less than 10 percent of daily price variance. This paper
shows that the arrival of macro news can account for more than 30 percent of daily price variance. Two
features of our analysis account for this ￿nding: (i) We consider the broad spectrum of macro news items
that market participants actually observe, not just scheduled announcements. (ii) We allow the arrival of
news to a⁄ect prices indirectly via its impact on the volatility of order ￿ ow. Our analysis shows that order
￿ ow variations contribute more to currency price dynamics following the arrival of public macro news than
at other times. This is not consistent with news e⁄ects being common knowledge that is impounded in price
directly. Roughly two-thirds of the total e⁄ect of macro news on the DM/$ exchange rate is transmitted via
order ￿ ow.
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All textbook models of currency pricing imply that public news determines prices directly: currency demand
shifts are common knowledge and any related transactions play no role in causing the change. In microeco-
nomic models of asset prices, transactions do a⁄ect prices causally (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom 1985, Kyle
1985). The causal role arises because transactions convey information that is not common knowledge. This
paper examines whether transactions transmit macroeconomic news to currency prices, and how this channel
compares to the direct channel.
We examine the impact of macro news on currency prices at intradaily and daily frequencies. We begin
at the 5-minute frequency. Estimates of our intraday model using interdealer order ￿ ows show that while
order ￿ ow contributes signi￿cantly to changing currency prices at all times, it contributes more to changing
prices immediately after news arrival.2 This is inconsistent with the textbook view that macro news e⁄ects
are common knowledge and therefore impounded in currency prices without any order ￿ ow role. It suggests,
instead, that macro news triggers trading that reveals dispersed information, which in turn a⁄ects currency
prices.
Our daily analysis provides further evidence that trading on news reveals incremental information. The
daily model distinguishes three sources of currency price variation. The ￿rst source mirrors traditional
models ￿macro news that is impounded immediately and directly. The second source is the indirect e⁄ect
of news on price via induced order ￿ ow. The third source is order ￿ ow that a⁄ects price but is unrelated
to public news (possibly induced by banks￿changing risk tolerances, ￿rms￿changing hedging demands, or
individuals￿changing liquidity demands; see, e.g., Evans and Lyons 2002a). We ￿nd that all three sources of
DM/$ price variation are signi￿cant. The arrival of macro news increases order ￿ ow variance signi￿cantly,
with the result that roughly two-thirds of the e⁄ect of macro news on currency prices is transmitted via order
￿ ow, the remainder being the direct e⁄ect of news. This is consistent with the intraday ￿nding that order
￿ ow is most important for determining currency prices during periods immediately following news arrival.
With both the direct and indirect channels operating, we ￿nd that macro news accounts for 36 percent of
total daily price variance. This is more than three times the explanatory power found in previous studies
(addressed below).
Though the literature on news and currency prices is long standing, until recently it had not used
quantities (order ￿ ow) to sort out the relationship. The literature has two branches: a ￿rst-moment branch
that addresses price-change direction and a second-moment branch that addresses price volatility. A common
￿nding of the ￿rst-moment branch is that directional price e⁄ects from scheduled macro announcements are
di¢ cult to detect at the daily frequency ￿they are swamped by other factors. Intraday event studies, such
2Order ￿ow is the cumulation over time of signed trades, where trades are signed according to whether the initiator is buying
or selling (the marketmaker posting the quote is the non-initiating side). Order ￿ow￿ s role in determining currency prices is
documented by Payne (2003), Rime (2000), Evans and Lyons (2002a,b), and Evans (2002), among many others. Flows from
individual end-user segments in currency markets are addressed in Lyons (2001), Froot and Ramadorai (2005), and Evans and
Lyons (2005), among others. Order ￿ow is similarly important for prices in bond markets, which share many informational and
structural features with currency markets (see, e.g., Green 2004, Fleming 2003, and Brandt and Kavajecz 2004).
1as Andersen et al. (2003), do ￿nd statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects, particularly for employment and money-
supply announcements.3 The second-moment branch on volatility e⁄ects from news is partly a response to
di¢ culty in ￿nding news e⁄ects on return ￿rst moments.4 This work ￿nds that announcements do indeed
produce the largest price changes.
Our analysis di⁄ers from both branches of the literature in two important respects. First, we consider
the full set of news items that are actually observed on news screens by market participants (the set consti-
tuting Reuters Money Market Headline News). This set includes the scheduled announcements concerning
macroeconomic variables that have been the focus of earlier research, and unscheduled news that account
for the majority of items appearing on news screens each day. Second, we model in detail how information
in a news item can be transmitted to prices via its a⁄ects on order ￿ ow, and more speci￿cally, on order ￿ ow
volatility. This indirect transmission mechanism is new to the literature and turns out to be empirically
important.
The distinguishing feature of our analysis is easily understood with the aid of an example. Suppose a
scheduled macro economic announcement on US GDP growth is greater than the expectations of market
participants. Furthermore, let us assume that everyone agrees that unexpectedly high US GDP growth
represents ￿good news￿for the international value of the dollar. If everyone agrees that GDP growth is x
percent higher than expected, and as a result, the dollar is y percent more valuable in terms of Japanese yen,
dealers will immediately quote a yen/dollar rate that is y percent higher. This is the standard mechanism
through which news directly impacts on currency prices. Now suppose that everyone agrees that the GDP
announcement represents ￿good news￿for the dollar, but that there are diverse opinions as to how large
the appreciation should be. Under these circumstances, the initial rise in the yen/dollar spot rate may be
viewed as too large by some market participants and too small by others. Those who view the rise as too
small will place orders to purchase the dollar, while those who view the rise as too large will place orders
to sell. In aggregate, the balance of these trades represents the order ￿ ow that dealers use to further revise
their spot rate quotes. In particular, positive (negative) order ￿ ow signals that the initial yen/dollar spot
rate was below (above) the balance of opinion among market participants concerning the implications of
the GDP announcement for the value of dollar. We term this process of price adjustment via order ￿ ow
the ￿indirect channel￿ . Notice that ￿good news￿for the dollar need not translate into positive order ￿ ow.
￿Good news￿can be associated with either positive or negative order ￿ ow depending on how dealers￿initial
adjusted quotes relate to the balance of opinion concerning the implications of the news. Rather, the indirect
channel is operable when there are diverse views about the implications of a news item that creates volatility
in order ￿ ow, which in turn feeds through to changes in currency prices.
3See also, for example, Cornell (1982), Engel and Frankel (1984), Hakkio and Pearce (1985), Ito and Roley (1987), Hardouvelis
(1988), Klein (1991), and Ederington and Lee (1995). For bond markets, see Fleming and Remolona (1997) and Balduzzi, Elton,
and Green (2001).
4See, for example, Goodhart et al. (1993), DeGennaro and Shrieves (1997), Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), and Melvin
and Yin (2000). For bond markets, see Fleming and Remolona (1999), Bollerslev, Cai, and Song (2000), and Huang, Cai, and
Wang (2002).
2Our ￿nding that macro news accounts for more than 30 percent of price variance helps to resolve a big
puzzle in international ￿nance ￿the news puzzle. The puzzle is that even the most comprehensive studies
of news e⁄ects on currency prices account for less than 10 percent of total price variation. A good example
at the daily frequency is Klein (1991). He regresses FX price changes on trade-balance news and ￿nds that
news explains about 40 percent of price changes on those days. This is an impressive ￿nding. However,
since trade balance news arrives monthly, roughly 95 percent of FX price variation is not included in the
regression (20 of 21 trading days per month). Thus, an R2 statistic of 0.4 implies that less than 3 percent
of total price variation is accounted for. Andersen et al. (2003) also report impressive R2 statistics within
their event windows (in this case, intraday windows). But as they note (p. 50), summing the amount of
time in all of their ￿ve-minute, post-event windows accounts for only 0.2 percent of their full sample period
(e.g., roughly one ￿ve-minute interval per day). Under the conservative assumption that news arrival causes
variance to increase by a factor of 10, their ￿ndings imply that news accounts for no more than 2 percent of
the total price variation.5 We estimate the contribution of macro news to be more than 30 percent because
we consider a much broader set of macro news items, and examine both the direct and indirect channels.
The two papers most closely related to our own are Green (2004) and Love and Payne (2004). Green
studies the bond market and uses spread decompositions to show that announcements induce a signi￿cant
increase in informational trading. Information asymmetry increases following the release of public informa-
tion in a way consistent with, for example, the skilled information processor models of Kim and Verrecchia
(1994,1997); see also Kandel and Pearson (1995). Green does not model how news e⁄ects the order ￿ ow
process, nor does he address the degree to which news can account for total price variation. Love and Payne
(2004) address the currency market and, like our paper, use order ￿ ow to study the e⁄ects of macro news.
Their focus, though, is quite di⁄erent. They analyze whether the direction of instantaneous price e⁄ects
from news is contemporaneously correlated with the direction of order ￿ ow. Though it is not clear why
this correlation should be present in a rational expectations setting, they do ￿nd that it is signi￿cant and
positive. Like Green, they do not address whether total price variation can be explained based on induced
order ￿ ow variance.
Our empirical strategy is based on the state-dependent heteroskedasticy methods developed by Rigobon
and Sack (R&S, 2004).6 This approach is a natural one given our focus on how news a⁄ects order ￿ ow
volatility. Speci￿cally, we identify the relative importance of direct and indirect news e⁄ects by allowing
5Security-return volatility is not constant over time (French and Roll 1986). Our daily-frequency example from Klein (1991)
could include two adjustments in this respect: including weekend price volatility in total variation lowers his overall explanatory
power; but announcement days tend to have higher volatility than non-announcement days, which raises his overall explanatory
power. Neither of these adjustments is large enough to alter the basic message. Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) report that
Employment Report has the largest impact on the instantaneous variance, increasing it by a factor of 10. If all announcements
had this large an e⁄ect, and the within-event-window R2 statistics were all one, news would still only account for 2 percent of
the total exchange rate variation. In fact, the R2 statistics in Andersen et al. (2003) are generally below 50 percent (Table 2),
so the 2 percent ￿gure is indeed an upper bound.
6See the discussion in Rigobon and Sack (2004) comparing the merits of the event-study and heteroskedasticity approaches.
Omitted variable bias in event-study analysis is a manifestation of a point made above, namely, that event e⁄ects are often
swamped by other factors a⁄ecting price.
3news to a⁄ect the variances of order ￿ ow and price di⁄erently. Another advantage of the R&S method is
that it does not require data on ex-ante expectations. This is important because the only data on ex-ante
expectations that is available comes from surveys about scheduled announcements. The R&S method allows
us to work with all of the news items that participants actually observe on the Reuters trading screen. It
requires the weaker assumption that one can identify changes in the variance of macro information shocks.
To ensure the robustness of our results, we model these variance changes in several di⁄erent ways in both
the intraday and daily analysis.
The remainder of the paper is in four sections. Section 2 describes our data and presents some descriptive
statistics. Section 3 presents the intraday analysis. Daily analysis is presented in Section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our order ￿ ow and price data are drawn from time-stamped, tick-by-tick transactions in the DM/$ spot
market over a four-month period, May 1 to August 31, 1996. The transactions are from the Reuters Dealing
2000-1 system which operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Excluding weekends and a feed interruption
caused by a power failure, there are 80 full trading days in the sample. Importantly, Dealing 2000-1 is a
bilateral interdealer system on which a dealer requests a quote from another dealer, and when received,
generally has only a few seconds to act before the quote is retracted. This type of data avoids the stale quote
problem that can cloud inferences about causality when news arrives since, unlike limit orders, these quotes
are always very short lived, are generally not extended at moments of anticipated public news arrival, and
are generally retracted at moments of unanticipated news arrival. In 1996 at the time of our sample, Dealing
2000-1 was the most widely used electronic dealing system: according to Reuters, over 90 percent of the
world￿ s bilateral transactions between DM/$ dealers took place through the system. Transactions between
dealers accounted for about 75 percent of total trading in major spot markets at the time. This 75 percent
breaks into two transaction types￿ direct (bilateral) and brokered (multilateral). Direct trading accounted
for about 60 percent of trades between market-makers and brokered trading accounted for about 40 percent.
(For more detail on this Reuters Dealing System see Lyons 2001 and Evans 2002; the latter includes details
on data collection and statistical properties.) For every trade executed on D2000-1, our data set includes a
time-stamped record of the transaction price and a bought/sold indicator. The bought/sold indicator allows
us to sign trades for measuring order ￿ ow.
Our intraday analysis uses transaction prices, order ￿ ow and trade intensity measured over ￿xed intervals
of ￿ve-minutes. We denote the last DM price for the purchase and sale of dollars in interval i as pask
i and
pbid
i respectively. (The preceding transaction is only seconds before the end of each 5-minute interval during
regular trading hours.) Interdealer order ￿ ow, xi; is the di⁄erence during interval i between the number of
4trades initiated by dealers buying dollars and the number initiated by dealers selling dollars.7 Similarly, we
measure trade intensity, ni; by the unsigned number of interdealer transactions during interval i: Although
the D2000-1 system permits trading 24 hours a day, in practice the vast majority of trading activity is
concentrated between 7 am and 5 pm BST (British Summer Time) (see Evans 2002). Our intraday analysis
focuses on price and order ￿ ow dynamics while there is continuous trading activity in the market. In other
words, we study how prices pask
i and pbid
i change between the end of consecutive 5-minute periods. Over our
four month sample there are 15,034 ￿ve-minute windows of consecutive trading activity.
Our daily analysis uses transaction prices and order ￿ ow measured once each trading day (i.e., Monday
through Friday excluding holidays). Daily versions of each data series are denoted with subscript t: For the
daily price, pt; we use the last DM price for the purchase of dollars before 5 pm BST each trading day.8
Daily order ￿ ow, xt; is the same as ￿ve-minute order ￿ ow xi save that it spans the time di⁄erence between
5 pm on trading days t ￿ 1 and t: Trading intensity on day t; nt; is de￿ned as the number of transactions
over the same daily interval. Notice that order ￿ ows and trade intensity are cumulated over weekends and
holidays.
The primary source of our news data is the Reuters Money Market Headline News screen (archived
by Olsen Associates). These screens are standard equipment on FX trading desks and are used for high
frequency monitoring by non-dealer participants as well. Reuters collects news reports from approximately
150 bureaus around the world. Each report must be approved by an economics editor at Reuters before
it appears as a news item on the Headline screens. The presence of this editorial process means that all
the news items in our data set were viewed as containing news-worthy economic information. At the same
time, competition between Reuters, Bloomberg and Dow Jones insures that editorial decisions minimize
publication delay. We impose a further layer of editorial screening by excluding from our data set news
items of the following four types: (i) reports of upcoming known holidays, (ii) reports that a scheduled data
release will take place (e.g., ￿Monthly employment report due out tomorrow￿ ), (iii) duplicate reports (the
same news is repeated with a slight change in wording), and (iv) reports referring to the DM/$ price or
market. The four ￿lters exclude less than 10 percent of news arrivals. The ￿rst three ￿lters are intended to
distill information that is truly incremental.9
A number of other factors give us con￿dence that our analysis is not signi￿cantly exposed to feedback
7In direct trading between marketmakers, order sizes are standardized, so variation in size is much smaller than variation in
the size of individual trades between marketmakers and their end-user customers. Note too that using measures of order ￿ow
based on numbers of transactions rather than size is common in work on equity markets, even when both measures are available
(see, e.g., Hasbrouck 1991). Our data set does include total dollar volume over our sample, which allows us to calculate an
average trade size, which we use below to interpret the estimated coe¢ cients.
8Using prices from buyer-initiated transactions eliminates return reversals from prices bouncing randomly from bid to ask.
9For concreteness, the ￿rst three news items in our ￿ltered data set are: (i) ￿march U.S. leading indicators show economy
easing￿ , (ii) ￿U.S. march construction spending rose 3.1 pct.￿and (iii) ￿march U.S. construction spending rebounds strongly￿.
Notice that although we ￿lter out duplicate news items, we retain items that interpret previous information, such as item (iii).
Does such an interpretation represent news? Clearly the 3.1% increase in construction spending could have been interpreted
by some as representing a strong rebound, but it seems far-fetched to assume that everyone subscribing to Reuters held this
view and recognized the unanimity of opinion. When there is anything short of a unanimous interpretation of a data release,
a subsequent news item providing interpretation will contain new information to at least some agents. Our prior is that data
releases rarely (if ever) meet this unanimity requirement and so we retain the interpretive items in our data set.
5from the DM/$ market to macro news ￿ ow. The potential here is that increased volatility in the DM/$
price creates incentives for reporters to initiate news items to explain it, which are then posted to the
Headline screen. Our fourth ￿lter helps to protect against this form of endogeneity insofar as the news item
makes reference to the DM/$ market. The well-de￿ned editorial process described also helps protect against
spurious news creation. Perhaps most important, the Headline screen is used by traders in many markets
(money markets, bond markets, currency markets, and others), so the audience is much wider than just
the DM/$ market. We ￿nd the hypothesis of feedback to news ￿ ow patently strained when it comes to our
analysis at the ￿ve-minute frequency.
We should emphasize that the estimation strategy we adopt in both our intraday and daily analysis
does not require that every news item is equally important. As we detail below, all we require is that the
news data can be used to identify variations in the ￿ ow of macro news hitting the FX market. For this
purpose we construct several di⁄erent measures of macro news ￿ ow: one based on the arrival rates of US
news items only, one based on German items only, and one based on the arrival of both US and German
items. We also use measures from the subset of releases that are scheduled. Here we combine the Reuters
data with survey data on ex-ante expectations (provided by Money Market Service) for 28 US variables and
12 Germany variables to compute measures of news ￿ ow from unexpected announcements.10 We use these
di⁄erent measures of macro news ￿ ow to check the robustness of our estimation results. In particular, since
the arrival of scheduled news is by de￿nition immune to possible feedback from FX price volatility to the
arrival of unscheduled news, comparing results using all news versus scheduled news allows us to empirically
investigate whether feedback is present.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in intraday and daily analyses. The upper
rows of panel A report sample statistics for the daily change in FX prices multiplied by 100, ￿pt; and the level
of interdealer order ￿ ow xt: The distribution of daily price changes is quite dispersed. The 5￿ th. and 95￿ th.
percentiles changes represent percentage changes of -0.78 and 0.45 in the DM purchase price of a dollar.
There is no detectable serial correlation in either price changes or order ￿ ow at the daily frequency: The
estimated ￿rst order autocorrelation in the ￿pt and xt series are 0.015 and -0.035, and both are statistically
insigni￿cant. The remaining rows in panel A report statistics on four of our measures of macro news ￿ ow. Aus
t
and Agm
t respectively denote the number of US and German news items appearing on the Reuters Headline
screen between 5:01 pm BST on day t ￿ 1 and 5 pm BST on day t. Aall




t denotes the arrival rate for the subset of scheduled news, de￿ned as the number
of scheduled releases between 5:01 pm BST on day t ￿ 1 and 5 pm BST on day t. As the table shows, the
median arrival rate for German news is four times the rate for US news. It seems unrealistic, a priori, that
10The US annoucements are for: Business Inventories, Capacity Utilization, Unemployment Claims, Consumer Con￿dence,
Construction, Consumer Prices, Credit, Durable Goods, Existing Home Sales, Factory Orders, GDP, the GDP De￿ator, the
Trade Balance, Housing Starts, Industrial Production, Leading Indicators, M1, M2, M3, NAPM, Nonfarm payroll Employment,
Personal Consumption Expenditure, Personal Income, the Producer Price Index, Retail Sales, the Budget De￿cit, the Unem-
ployment Rate, and the Federal Funds Rate. The German announcements are for: the Current Account, Employment, GDP,
Import Prices, Industrial Production, M3, Manufacturing Orders, Manufacturing Output, Retail Sales, the Trade Balance,
Wholesale Prices, and the Cost of Living.
6Table 1: Sample Statistics
Min 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% Max Std. Skew. Kurt.
A: Daily Data
￿pt -2.07 -1.19 -0.38 0.03 0.34 0.69 1.24 0.59 -0.81 3.85
xt -449 -308 -61 8 91 186 339 136.4 -0.58 4.54
Aus
t 0 0 1 2 5 7 9 1.80 1.20 3.76
Agm
t 0 2 6 8 12 18 22 5.01 0.48 2.89
Aall
t 0 2 9 11 15 21 27 5.70 0.33 2.82
As
t 0 0 1 2 4 6 10 2.12 1.14 4.23
B: Intraday Data
￿pi -0.79 -0.14 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.5 0.08 -0.21 7.42
xi -72 -9 -2 0 3 9 69 5.56 0.09 12.60
ni 2 2 30 60 105 220 1060 78.34 3.28 22.43
Autocorrelations
Lag = 1 2 3 4 5 6 12 18 24
￿pi -0.31 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(<.01) (0.35) (0.76) (0.79) (0.68) (0.23) (0.69) (0.60) (0.64)
xi 0.23 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.00
(<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (0.01) (0.65)
Notes: The sample is May 1 to August 31, 1996. ￿pt is 100 times the change in the last DM
purchase price for dollars between 5:00 pm on day t and day t ￿ 1. xt is the total interdealer order
￿ ow over the same time interval. Aus
t and Agm
t are respectively the number of macro news arrivals
observed on the Reuters Money Market Headline News screen relating to the US and Germany
between 5:00 pm on day t and day t ￿ 1. Aall




t is the total number of scheduled news items arriving over the same time interval. Schedule
announcements are listed in footnote 10. In panel B, ￿pi is 100 times the change in price (DM
purchase price for dollars) between the end of interval i and i ￿ 1: xi and ni are the order ￿ ows
and total number of trades in interval i:
information about the German economy is being disseminated to the public on average at four times the
rate of information concerning the US economy. In our analysis below we will examine whether Agm
t and
Aus
t respectively overstate and understand the true arrival rate for news. Notice also that the arrival rates
for Aall
t are considerably higher than the rate for scheduled news, As
t: This observation serves to emphasize
the point that scheduled news is not the only real-time source of public information available to market
participants.
Panel B of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for prices, order ￿ ow, and trade intensity measured at
the 5-minute frequency. The sample statistics for ￿pask
i and ￿pbid
i are almost identical, so we only report
those for ￿pask
i (i.e. the change the DM price for the last purchase of dollars in interval i ￿ 1 and interval
i multiplied by 100): As one would expect, the range of price changes and order ￿ ows at the 5-minute
7frequency are much smaller than at the daily frequency. One noteworthy feature of these statistics concerns
the distribution of trade intensity, ni: While the median trade intensity in our sample is 60 trades per interval
(i.e., 12 trades per minute), the distribution for ni indicates that the pace of trading is occasionally much
higher. Evans (2002) shows that some of the variations in trade intensity can be related to the shift from
predominantly Asian-based to US-based dealers as the trading day progresses. However, on a particular day,
variations in trade intensity can di⁄er signi￿cantly from this ￿seasonal￿pattern. From the lower portion of
panel B, we see a sharp di⁄erence from the daily frequency statistics: both price changes and order ￿ ows are
serially correlated at high (intraday) frequencies.11 Transaction price changes display signi￿cant negative
autocorrelation, but only at lag one, while order ￿ ow appears serially correlated at up to 18 lags. Negative
￿rst order serial correlation in the transaction price changes is not due to bid-ask bounce because the prices
here are all ask prices. Rather it re￿ ects the decentralized nature of trading on the D2000-1 system. Our
transaction prices are not the prices quoted by a single dealer, instead they represent the prices at which a
sequence of particular trades took place between any pairs of dealers using the D2000-1 system. Evans (2002)
shows that negative serial correlation in price changes can arise in this situation if the lack of transparency
in interdealer trading permits the existence of bid and ask quote distributions at a point in time without
introducing arbitrage opportunities. Since interdealer trading on D2000-1 lacks transparency (details of each
trade remain the private information of the trading parties) we allow for the presence of quote distributions
in our intraday analysis and thereby account for the serial correlation properties of price changes.12
We track the arrival of news at the 5-minute frequency with dummy variables. The dummy variable Ai
takes the value of one if either a US or German news item appears on the Reuters screen during interval i:
At least one news arrival occurs in 515 out of the 15,034 consecutive trading windows. We use this dummy-
variable approach in the ￿ve-minute data because there are few instances of more than one news arrival
during a single ￿ve-minute observation window (in 29/515 there were two arrivals and in 4/515 there were
three, numbers that proved insu¢ cient to get mileage from a multi-valued dummy). We also make use of






Our intraday analysis is based on a model for the joint dynamics of FX prices and order ￿ ows estimated
at the 5-minute frequency. Information is impounded into FX prices via two channels. The ￿rst is the
direct channel through which the arrival of new common-knowledge information leads dealers to change
11Autocorrelations are computed by GMM as in Evans (2002) and the p-values reported in parenthesis are calculated from
Wald tests of the null hypothesis of a zero correlation (allowing for conditional heteroskedasticity).
12We have investigated whether the serial correlation properties of price changes are a⁄ected by the arrival of news. This
would be the case if prices systematically under or over-react to news because any under (over) -reaction will induce positive
(negative) serial correlation in price changes following its arrival. Regressions of ￿pi on ￿pi￿1 and ￿pi￿1 ￿Ai￿1 where Ai is a
dummy variable indicating the arrival of news (see below) did not produce statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients on ￿pi￿1 ￿Ai￿1
where Ai indicated the arrival of US news, German news or just scheduled news.
8the FX prices they quote. The transmission of information into FX prices via this channel is direct and
instantaneous. The second channel, the indirect channel, operates via order ￿ ow. In this case the arrival of
information is ￿rst manifest in the trading decisions of individuals because the information is dispersed. Once
dealers observe the ensuing order ￿ ow, they adjust their FX quotes to re￿ ect the new information embedded
in the pattern of trading. Thus, order ￿ ow is the medium by which dispersed information becomes embedded
into FX prices.
Our intraday analysis will focus on the relative importance of the direct and indirect information channels
in the period immediately following the arrival of news. The motivation for this focus is straightforward:
If macro news primarily comprises new common-knowledge information, as is traditionally assumed, we
should ￿nd evidence that the direct channel accounts for most of the FX price variation over intervals that
include the news arrival. Conversely, if the arrival of macro news triggers revelation of dispersed information,
possibly re￿ ecting diverse views about price implications, we should ￿nd that the indirect channel dominates.
We will quantify the relative importance of the direct and indirect channels from a decomposition of the
variance in FX price changes.
3.1 The Model
Our intraday model extends the empirical model in Evans (2002) to account for the e⁄ects of news arrivals.
At the heart of the model are the following equations:
￿pi = B(L)￿i + "i; (1)
yi = Cy(L)￿i; (2)
where ￿pi is the change in the spot price of FX between the end of periods i￿1 and i; and yi is the order ￿ ow
initiated by end-users during period i. (The relationship between this end-user ￿ ow yi and inter-dealer ￿ ow
xi is addressed below.) Equation (1) shows how prices respond to two types of news: common knowledge
news shocks "i; and dispersed information shocks, ￿i: We assume that these shocks are mutually independent
and serially uncorrelated conditioned on the state of the market in period i (de￿ned below). The "i shocks
represent unambiguous price-relevant news that is simultaneously observed by everyone and so are impounded
fully and instantaneously into the price of FX. Dispersed information shocks represent, in aggregate, the
bits of information contained in the trades of individual agents. This information is ￿rst manifested in the
order ￿ ow, yi; and then subsequently impounded in price. End-user order ￿ ow is the di⁄erence between the
purchase and sales of dollars initiated by end-users at dealer FX quotes. The dynamic responses of prices
and order ￿ ow to these dispersed information shocks are determined by the lag polynomials B(L) and Cy(L).
Three features of our speci￿cation deserve note. First, equation (1) describes the dynamics of transactions
prices, pi; de￿ned as the market-wide average price at which actual transactions take place at time i: We
will describe the link between this pi and actual transactions below. Second, the assumed independence
9between the common-knowledge and dispersed information news shock implies that conditioned on the state
of the market, common-knowledge news has no e⁄ect on order ￿ ow. This assumption has a long history in
empirical ￿nance, dating back at least to the work of Hasbrouck (1991), and serving as the basis for much
important work by various authors since then (see, e.g., Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans 1997 and
the survey in Madhavan 2000). Intuitively, any revision in price due to common-knowledge news should
establish a new market-clearing price that does not systematically favor subsequent imbalances of sell orders
over buy orders, or vice versa. For example, there should not be a correlation between bad public news for
the DM and subsequent net DM sell orders, so long as the intial update of the market price is unbiased.13
(Notice that this has nothing to do with the behavior of unsigned trading volume; our model does not
restrict how common-knowledge news a⁄ects volume through, say, portfolio rebalancing.) The third feature
concerns the dynamics of end-user order ￿ ow yi: We assume that end-users￿demand for foreign currency is
imperfectly elastic, so any imbalance in order ￿ ow (i.e., yi 6= 0) requires price adjustment to achieve market
clearing. Consequently, all order ￿ ow is, at least temporarily, price relevant.14 Under rational expectations,
this information is summarized in current and past dispersed information shocks, but remains unrelated to
common-knowledge news shocks, as shown in equation (2).
Equations (1) and (2) allow us to identify three channels through which the arrival of macro news may
a⁄ect the dynamics of price and order ￿ ows. First, when the macro announcement contains a common-
knowledge component, it will a⁄ect prices instantaneously via the "i shock. This direct channel will be
operable when everyone agrees on the price-implications of the announcement. Second, when a macro
announcement is viewed by di⁄erent agents as having di⁄erent price implications, its e⁄ects on prices and
order ￿ ow will manifest via the ￿i shocks: Although everyone observes the same announcement, di⁄erent
views about the mapping from macro data to FX prices represent dispersed information that is relevant
for equilibrium prices. Third, the arrival of a macro announcement can a⁄ect the process through which
dispersed news is impounded into prices, by which we mean the lag polynomials. We allow for this by
allowing B(L) and Cy(L) to vary with the arrival of news announcements.
3.1.1 Empirical Speci￿cation
Estimation of our intraday model is complicated by two factors: First, our data are on market-wide order
￿ ow between dealers, xi; rather than the end-user order ￿ ows yi: We must be careful to distinguish these
di⁄erent order ￿ ows if we are to account for the temporal impact of dispersed information. Second, our
13Recall from footnote 12 that the serial correlation properties of price changes appear una⁄ected by the arrival of news ￿
a feature of the data that is consistent with our unbiasedness assumption. We have also examined unbiasedness by regressing
order ￿ow, xi; on the contemporaneous surprise in scheduled news announcements, using the change in purchase price ￿pi as
an instrument. The regression coe¢ cient should be zero under the null of unbiasedness, a hypothesis we cannot reject in our
data. Further details regarding this test are available upon request.
14Our elasticity assumption does not imply that shocks to order ￿ow necessarily have permanent price e⁄ects. It is possible
that some shocks to order ￿ow only a⁄ect prices while the associated inventory imbalance is being spread among dealers (see
Cao, Evans and Lyons 2006). In this special case, some of the individual coe¢ cients in B(L) will di⁄er from zero, but their
sum will equal zero.
10model needs to accommodate forms of state-dependency beyond the arrival of macro news. We shall deal
with these complications in turn.
Prices in the data set come in two forms. If a dealer initiating a transaction buys dollars, the transaction
price equals the ask quote in DMs per dollar o⁄ered by the other dealer. We refer to this as the DM purchase
price for dollars, pask. If the dealer initiating a transaction sells dollars, the transaction price will equal the
bid quote given by the other dealer. We refer to this as the DM sale price for dollars, pbid: Evans (2002)
￿nds evidence that lack of transparency in direct dealer trading allows for an equilibrium price distribution,
as opposed to a strict law of one price. To formalize this idea, our intraday model assumes that equilibrium




i denote observed prices drawn randomly from the respective distributions of purchase
and sales prices at time i. These observed prices are related to the average transaction price, pi; de￿ned in
(1), by:
po
i = pi + ￿o
i; (3)
for o = fask;bidg: ￿ask
i and ￿bid
i are idiosyncratic shocks that identify the degree to which observed prices
di⁄er from the market-wide average. Their size depends on the identity of the dealers whose prices we
observe. We assume that observed prices are drawn randomly and independently from the cross-sectional
distributions of purchase and sale prices every period, so that ￿ask
i and ￿bid
i are serially uncorrelated and
independently distributed.
The second complication arises from the distinction between the interdealer and end-user order ￿ ows.
The order ￿ ow measure in our data set is derived from trades initiated between dealers. These trades
are temporally downstream from the trades initiated by end-users against dealer quotes. As a result, it is
possible for a dispersed information shock ￿i to a⁄ect prices and end-user order ￿ ows before it shows up in
interdealer order ￿ ow: Dealers may adjust their price in the face of an end-user order induced by ￿i before
initiating trades in the interdealer market for risk sharing or speculative motives. Thus, price changes may
appear temporally prior to changes in interdealer order ￿ ow even though they represent a response to earlier
end-user order ￿ ow. We allow for this possibility by assuming that the interdealer order ￿ ow we measure is
a distributed lag of end-user order ￿ ow:
xi = Cx(L)yi￿m; (4)
where, again, Cx(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator. In this speci￿cation, it takes at least m periods
before imbalances in end-user orders for FX show up in interdealer order ￿ ow (where m may be zero).
The link between end-user order ￿ ow and interdealer order ￿ ow in (4) is consistent with the predictions
of theoretical models of multiple-dealer markets, such as the simultaneous trade model of Lyons (1997). In
that model, the optimal strategy for a dealer is to initiate trade with other dealers in proportion to the
end-user order ￿ ow he receives. Equation (4) weakens this prediction by assuming that interdealer order
11￿ ow is proportional to a distributed lag of end-user ￿ ows. Allowing for richer dynamics makes sense here
because the degree of transparency assumed by the simultaneous trade model is higher than that present
on the D2000-1 system. Lower transparency gives individual dealers the ability to adjust their quotes in
response to incoming end-user ￿ ows without creating opportunities for arbitrage. Indeed, empirical studies
of individual dealer behavior (e.g. Lyons 1995) show that this is exactly what they do. Consequently, our
empirical speci￿cation needs to accommodate dealer strategies in which incoming end-user order ￿ ow triggers
a change in quotes before impacting on interdealer order ￿ ow.15
Combining (4) with (1) and (2), we can now represent the dynamics of prices and interdealer order ￿ ow
by:
￿pi = D(L)xi + "i; (5)
xi = C(L)￿i￿m (6)
where D(L) = B(L)L￿mC(L)￿1 and C(L) = Cx(L)Cy(L): Although the polynomial D(L) may take many
forms depending on the dynamic responses of price and interdealer order ￿ ow to dispersed information
shocks, in general it will include both negative and positive powers of L (corresponding to leads and lags
of xi) when m > 0. Our model estimates are based on a sixth-order speci￿cation for D(L) (shown below)
that links ￿pi to interdealer order ￿ ows from xi+4 to xi￿1: This speci￿cation is supported by a series of
diagnostic tests reported in Evans (2002). It implies that a dispersed information shock may impact end-user
orders and prices up to 20 minutes before it a⁄ects interdealer order ￿ ow (i.e., m = 4). Similarly, we specify
the form of C(L) so that the time series properties implied by (6) match those in the data. As in Evans




Finally, we incorporate the e⁄ects of macro news. We treat the arrival of news as changing the state of
the market. Following Evans (2002), we also allow the dynamics of prices and order ￿ ow to vary with trading
intensity. Including trading intensity as a state variable is important for accommodating the pronounced
time-dependence in volatility documented by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998). Let Si denote the state of the
market in period i: We assume that Si depends on trading intensity in period i; ni; and the arrival of news
during the past three periods, Ai; Ai￿1 and Ai￿2: (Recall that the dummy variable Ai equals one if a macro
news arrives during period i.) We incorporate state-dependency into the price and order ￿ ow dynamics via
the polynomial D(L); and the error variances. Speci￿cally, D(L) is replaced by D(L;S); a state-dependent
15One implication of our speci￿cation in (4) is that price changes will have forecasting power for future interdealer order
￿ow when m > 0: This does not mean that dealers could forecast future order ￿ow in real time. No dealer had access to the
sequence of transaction prices we have in our dataset. Consequently, the lead-lag relationship between price changes and order
￿ow in the reduced form equations of our model are not attributable to feedback trading from transaction prices to order ￿ow
by dealers.
12sixth order polynomial:
D(L;S) = d1(n; ￿ A)L￿4 + d2(n; ￿ A)L￿3 + :::: + d5(n; ￿ A) + d6(n; ￿ A)L: (7)
where ￿ Ai ￿ maxfAi;Ai￿1;Ai￿2g with state-dependent coe¢ cients dj(:;:): Thus, d6(n;1) is the coe¢ cient
on lagged order ￿ ow xi when trade intensity equals n and news arrived in the past 15 minutes. We also
allow for state-dependence in the error variances, V ar("ijSi) = ￿"(ni;Ai); V ar(￿ijSi) = ￿￿(ni;Ai); and
V ar(￿ask
i jSi) = V ar(￿bid
i jSi) = ￿￿(ni;Ai): State-dependence in the coe¢ cients and variances is modeled as:
dj(n; ￿ A) = dj( ￿ A)e(￿n=500) + dj( ￿ A)[1 ￿ e(￿n=500)]; (8)
￿j(n;A) = !j(A)e(￿n=500) + !j(A)[1 ￿ e(￿n=500)]; (9)
where dj(0), dj(0), !j(0), and !j(0) are the parameters to be estimated for observations without a news
arrival, and dj(1), dj(1), !j(1), and !j(1) when there is a news arrival. These functional forms make dj(:)
and ￿j(:) smooth monotonic functions of trade intensity and are similar to the transition functions used in
nonlinear time series models (Potter 1999). They bound the coe¢ cients between dj( ￿ A) and dj( ￿ A); and the
variances between !j(A) and !j(A) as trade intensity varies between 0 and 1:
Several aspects of our speci￿cation for state-dependency deserve comment. First, while specialized with
respect to variations in trading intensity, the functional forms in (7) - (9) do not appear unduly restrictive
when we subject our model to speci￿cation tests below. Second, there is no evidence that variations in trading
intensity or the arrival of news a⁄ect the dynamics of order ￿ ow via C(L): Thus, we do not incorporate state-
dependency in this polynomial to avoid an unnecessary proliferation in parameters. Third, our speci￿cation
places minimal restrictions on how the arrival of news a⁄ects the error variances and the link between order
￿ ow and price dynamics. Importantly, we do not restrict how the coe¢ cients in D(L;S) or the error variances
change following the arrival of news. Consequently, our speci￿cation does not impose a prior about how the
arrival of macro news a⁄ects the relative importance of the direct and indirect information transmission
channels. Finally, our speci￿cation makes no distinction between the arrival of US news, German news,
scheduled news or unscheduled news; Ai equals one when any news arrives during period i. We recognize
that this assumption may be too restrictive. For example, it is possible that the information transmission
process following the arrival of scheduled US news di⁄ers from that following other news items. Below we
investigate the adequacy of this assumption with a series of speci￿cation tests.
133.1.2 Estimation
The model is estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments technique developed in Evans (2002).
The moment conditions used to estimate the parameters of the order ￿ ow process are












where ￿i = xi+4 ￿
P10
j=1 cjxi+4￿j and ￿￿(Si) is the conditional variance of ￿i speci￿ed in (9). (Hereafter,
we use Si rather than ni and Ai as the argument of the error variances, ￿(:).) If the order ￿ ow process
is correctly speci￿ed, a dispersed information shock ￿ in period i should be uncorrelated with interdealer
order ￿ ow x in periods i + 3 and earlier. Similarly, the di⁄erence between ￿
2
i and the conditional variance
should be uncorrelated with current or past trade intensity and order ￿ ows. We employ {xi+3;::::xi￿6g and
four lagged values of ￿i as elements of the instrument vector zx
i in (10a). In (10b) the instrument vector
contains a constant, e(￿ni=500) and Ai: With this choice of instruments, equations (10a) and (10b) represent
17 moment restrictions on 14 parameters (fcjg
10
j=1 ;!￿(0);!￿(1);!￿(0) and !￿(1)):
Parameters of the price process are computed from moments using the bivariate process for purchase and
sales prices, ￿pask
i and ￿pbid











i ￿ "i + ￿o
i ￿ ￿o
i￿1 for o= fask;bidg: This equation describes the state-dependent relation between
actual transactions prices and interdealer order ￿ ow implied by our model. Notice that the composite
error term, uo
i; follows an MA(1) process and that Cov (uask
i ;ubid
i ) = ￿" (ni;Ai). We account for this error
structure in the moment conditions used to estimate the parameters of the price process:
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for o;ł = fask;bidg and ł 6=o. The moment restriction in (11a) exploits the assumed orthogonality between
the instruments, z
p
t ; and both the common knowledge news and idiosyncratic shocks. The other restrictions
14in (11) are derived from the moving average structure of the composite error. In particular, (11b) and (11c)
focus on the variance of fuask
i ;ubid
i g; while (11d) - (11g) focus on the the autocovariance. For example, in
(11f) and (11g) we exploit the fact that under an MA(1) process, all the autocorrelations in the composite
errors at lag 2 are zero. We use {xi+j; e(￿ni=500)xi+j; ￿ Aixi+j; ￿ Aie(￿ni=500)xi+jg4





in (11b) - (11g). This instrument choice gives us 81 moment restrictions on the 32









In standard time series applications, GMM estimates of the parameter vector ￿ are found by minimizing
a quadratic form constructed from the sample analogues of the moment conditions implied by the model.
In this application, estimation is complicated by the fact that the gap between successive purchases and/or
sales occasionally spans many minutes. In these cases there is no record of an FX purchase and/or sale in
the observation interval. For the purpose of computing our estimates, we designate the price, and order ￿ ow
observations from these periods as ￿missing￿ and construct sample moments without these observations.
Speci￿cally, let E[mi;j(￿)] = 0 denote condition j among the moment conditions shown in (10) and (11) and
let ￿ = fi1;:i2:::iTg be the set of observations for which none of the elements in mi;j(:) for all j is ￿missing￿ .
We compute the sample analogue to condition j as ￿ mj(￿) = T￿1 P
￿ mi;j(:): The GMM estimates of ￿ are
then found by minimizing:
Q(￿) = ￿ m(￿)0W￿1 ￿ m(￿); (12)
where ￿ m(￿) = [￿ m1(￿); ￿ m2(￿);::::]0: Our model speci￿cation implies that the moments include observations on
order ￿ ow and price changes over 15 periods of continuous trading (i.e. 75 minutes). Consequently, data from
the periods of intermittent trading that occur before 7 am or after 5pm BST on trading days are excluded
from our estimation sample. Nevertheless, this leaves us with a large sample of T = 11;473 observations
from which to compute the moments ￿ m(￿):
We follow the standard practice of ￿rst setting the weighting matrix W equal to the identity to obtain
consistent estimates of ￿: These estimates, ~ ￿; then are used to compute a consistent estimate of the optimal
weighting matrix, ~ W. We construct ~ W using the Newey and West (1987) estimator for the covariance
of mi;j(￿) incorporating a correction for MA(1) serial correlation. This estimate of the covariance matrix
allows for the fact, documented below, that the model fails to completely account for the heteroskedasticity
in prices and order ￿ ow. The GMM estimates, ^ ￿; are found by minimizing (12) with W = ~ W: The asymptotic
covariance matrix of the resulting estimates is ^ V = [ ^ G ~ W￿1 ^ G0]￿1 where ^ G = @ ￿ m(^ ￿)=@￿
0:
We examine the performance of our estimated model with a series of diagnostic tests. In particular, we
use a chi-squared test to examine the validity of an auxiliary set of moment conditions implied by our model
but not used in estimation. Let ￿ mii(￿) denote a vector of Kii sample moments, comprising the Ki moments
used to ￿nd the GMM estimates, and Kii￿Ki auxiliary moment conditions implied by the model. Following
Hayashi (2000), we construct the test statistic by ￿rst ￿nding the GMM estimates of ￿; denoted ^ ￿ii; from
the set of Kii moments. These estimates are found with the two-step procedure described above using the
Newey and West estimator from the ￿rst step to construct the weighting matrix, ~ Wii: Next, we construct the
15submatrix of ~ Wii corresponding to the original Ki moments, ~ Wi: We then ￿nd an alternative set of GMM
estimates, ^ ￿i; by minimizing (12) with W = ~ Wi: Finally, we form the test statistic
C ￿ T ￿ mii(^ ￿ii)0 ~ W￿1
ii ￿ mii(^ ￿ii) ￿ T ￿ m(^ ￿i)0 ~ W￿1
i ￿ m(^ ￿i); (13)
where T denotes the number of ￿non-missing￿elements used to construct ￿ mii(￿): Under the null hypothesis
that the auxiliary moment conditions are satis￿ed, the C statistic has an asymptotic chi-squared distribution
with Kii ￿ Ki degrees of freedom. We use this test below to examine the adequacy of our speci￿cation for
the state-dependent coe¢ cients and error variances.
3.1.3 Model Estimates
Table 2 presents GMM estimates of the intraday model. In speci￿cations where all the variance parameters
were left unrestricted, the estimates of !"(A); !￿(A); and !￿(A) were very close to zero (i.e. < 0.0001), so
the table reports estimates where these parameters are restricted to zero. With these restrictions imposed,
there are 40 parameters to be estimated from a total of 98 moment restrictions, so our estimates are derived
from a model with 58 over-identifying restrictions. The Hansen (1982) J￿ statistic computed from our GMM
estimates is 68.645 which implies a p-value of 0.160 for the null of a correctly speci￿ed model.
Panel A of Table 2 reports the parameters for the state-dependent order ￿ ow polynomial, D(L;S): A
comparison of the estimates in rows (i) and (ii) and rows (iii) and (iv) shows that trade intensity has di⁄ering
e⁄ects on the price-impact of order ￿ ow depending on the arrival of news. This is most easily seen in the
right hand column where we report the sum of the coe¢ cients in di⁄erent market states. These estimates
have two noteworthy features. First, the long run impact of order ￿ ow on prices is much larger when trading




j dj(:)). Second, controlling for trading intensity, the arrival of news slightly
reduces the long￿ run impact of order ￿ ow (
P
j dj( ￿ A = 1) <
P
j dj( ￿ A = 0), except at the very lowest trade
intensities). Further evidence on the importance of state-dependency is provided by the four test statistics
shown at the bottom of the panel. Here we report the results of Wald tests for the following coe¢ cient
restrictions: (i) dj(0) = dj(0); (ii) dj(1) = dj(1); (iii) dj(1) = dj(0); and (iv) dj(1) = dj(0) for j = f1;:::;6g:
As the table shows, there is strong statistical evidence against all of these restrictions. These ￿ndings are
consistent with the non-parametric evidence on state-dependence in hourly price change data reported in
Evans and Lyons (2002b). Love and Payne (2003) also ￿nd evidence that the price-impact of order ￿ ow
varies according to the arrival of scheduled macroeconomic news. Our results show that it is important to
accommodate state-dependency with respect to both the arrival of news and variations in trading intensity.
Parameter estimates from the order ￿ ow equation are reported in Panel B. Many of the coe¢ cients are
highly statistically signi￿cant, indicating that there is indeed a good deal of serial correlation in intraday
order ￿ ow. The table also reports the estimate of (1 ￿
P
j cj)￿1 which measures the cumulative long-run
e⁄ect of dispersed information on order ￿ ow. The estimate of 1.69 indicates that the cumulative e⁄ect of a
dispersed information shock is approximately 70 percent greater than its initial impact.
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dj( ￿ Ai)e￿ni=500 + dj( ￿ Ai)(1 ￿ e￿ni=500)
￿
xi+5￿j + "i
d1(:) d2(:) d3(:) d4(:) d5(:) d6(:)
P
j dj(:)
^ A = 0 0.029 0.025 0.028 -0.047 -0.113 -0.034 -0.113
(0.024) (0.057) (0.233) (0.052) (0.025) (0.033) (0.030)
^ A = 1 -0.022 0.074 0.054 -0.131 0.002 -0.066 -0.089
(0.045) (0.046) (0.042) (0.046) (0.044) (0.043) (0.070)
d1(:) d2(:) d3(:) d4(:) d5(:) d6(:)
P
j dj(:)
^ A = 0 0.127 0.275 0.543 0.629 -0.220 -0.062 1.293
(0.106) (0.210) (0.716) (0.186) (0.078) (0.101) (0.106)
^ A = 1 0.278 -0.018 0.256 0.858 -0.449 0.091 1.015
(0.153) (0.139) (0.131) (0.133) (0.107) (0.114) (0.209)
Wald Tests
dj(0)=dj(0) dj(1)=dj(1) dj(1)=dj(0) dj(1)=dj(0)
216.083 19.096 20.896 11.953
(<0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.063)
B: Order Flow Equation: xi =
P10
j=1 cjxi￿j + ￿i￿4
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6
0.21 0.036 0.048 0.033 0.019 0.025
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
c7 c8 c9 c10 (1 ￿
P10
j=1 cj)￿1
0.015 0.017 -0.016 0.020 1.688
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.070)




Idiosyncratic Common Knowledge Dispersed Information
!￿(:) !￿(:) !"(:) !"(:) !￿(:) !￿(:)
A = 0 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.032
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.002)
A = 1 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.032
(<0.001) - (0.002) (0.034)
Notes: The table reports GMM estimates with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses corrected for
conditional heteroskedasticity and an MA(1) error term. News arrival is denoted by Ai and ￿ Ai, with
￿ Ai = maxfAi;Ai￿1;Ai￿2g where Ai = 1 if there was a news arrival during the previous 5-minutes.
Coe¢ cients and standard errors in panel A are multiplied by 100. P-values are reported in parentheses
below the Wald statistics in panel A. For the variance parameters, P-values are not reported in cases where
unrestricted parameter estimates were <0.0001 because these parameters were restricted to zero.
17Panel C of Table 2 reports the estimated parameters of the state-dependent error variances. The estimated
values for !￿(A) imply that the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shocks slowly falls from approximately
0.04 to 0.01 as n varies from 2 to 1000. Thus, the cross-sectional dispersion of transactions prices falls as
trade intensity increases, as in Evans (2002), but we ￿nd no evidence that dispersion depends on the arrival
of news. The estimates of !"(A) indicate how the volatility of common-knowledge shocks varies with trade
intensity and the arrival of news. The estimated standard deviation of common-knowledge shocks rises from
approximately 0.01 to 0.09 as n varies between 2 and 1000 when news is absent, and from 0.01 to 0.07 when
news arrives. The estimated standard deviation of dispersed information shocks also increases with trade
intensity: from 0.01 to 0.17 percent as n varies between 2 and 1000, whether or not news arrives.
Two implications of these estimates deserve emphasis. First, under normal trading conditions, much of
the observed volatility in high frequency transactions prices is attributable to the dispersion of prices that
characterizes market activity at a point in time. Failure to account for this feature of the data would leave
our analysis of how news arrivals a⁄ect prices and order ￿ ow ￿ awed. Second, our estimates only show how
the arrival of news a⁄ects price and order ￿ ow dynamics for a given level of trade intensity. If the arrival of
news changes trade intensity, as indeed it does, the total impact of news on prices and order ￿ ow will re￿ ect
both the direct e⁄ect of news and the indirect e⁄ects associated with the induced change in trade intensity.
We examine the combined e⁄ects of news in Table 4 below.
One important aspect of the model concerns the link between end-user order ￿ ow and interdealer order
￿ ow. Our estimated speci￿cation in (6) assumes that the dispersed information in a news announcement
shows up in interdealer order ￿ ow with up to a twenty minute delay. We can test the validity of this
assumption by regressing the squared residuals from the order ￿ ow equation (i.e. ^ ￿
2
i￿4 from estimates of
equation (6)) on current and lagged values of the news dummies {Ai;Ai￿1;:::Ai￿6;g and trade intensities
{ni;ni￿1;:::ni￿6;g: According to our model, none of the coe¢ cients on Ai through Ai￿3 should be signi￿cant
because dispersed information contained in period-i news should only show up in the variance of interdealer
order ￿ ow in period i ￿ 4: This prediction is con￿rmed in the data. None of the individual coe¢ cients on
Ai through Ai￿3 are statistically signi￿cant, and the p-value for the null that all four are zero is 0.568. By
contrast, a joint test for the signi￿cant of the coe¢ cients on Ai￿4 through Ai￿6 has a p-value of 0.011. This
is strong evidence supporting our empirical speci￿cation.
Our speci￿cation for the intraday model imposes many more moment conditions than were used in GMM
estimation. Table 3 provides diagnostics in the form of C-tests on a selection of these additional moment
conditions. The tests in column (a) look for state-dependency in the order ￿ ow polynomial C(L): For this
purpose we compute C-statistics for restrictions of the form E[￿ixi+4￿jzi] = 0 for j = f1;2;:::;10g; where
zi equals ni; Aus
i and As
i in rows (i) (ii), and (iii) respectively. These moment conditions will not hold
if, contrary to the assumption of our model, the serial correlation in order ￿ ow varies with either trade
intensity, the arrival of US news, or the arrival of scheduled news. The tests reported in column (b) look
for misspeci￿cation in the estimated form of the D(L;S) polynomial. In this case the restrictions being
18Table 3: Diagnostics for Intraday Model
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
C(L) D(L;S) ￿" (S) ￿￿ (S) ￿￿ (S)
Instrument: zi
(i) Trade Intensity ni 2.624 0.371 0.737 0.200 0.134
(0.989) (0.999) (0.391) (0.655) (0.714)
(ii) US News Aus
i 1.731 19.083 0.950 1.731 0.019
(0.188) (0.087) (0.330) (0.188) (0.891)
(iii) Scheduled News As
i 17.905 13.084 3.904 2.307 1.660
(0.084) (0.363) (0.068) (0.129) (0.198)
(iv) Residual ARCH 17.543 30.123 8.190
(0.001) (<0.001) (0.042)
Notes: The table reports C-tests for a set of auxiliary moment conditions implied by
the model. In column (a) the restrictions take the form E[￿ixi+4￿jzi] = 0 for j =
f1;2;:::;10g. The restrictions in (b) are E[uo




i￿1 for o = fask;bidg: In columns (c) - (e) the restrictions are E[{izi] = 0
where {i ￿ uo
iuł
i ￿ ￿"(ni;Ai) in (c), {i ￿ ￿
2
i ￿ ￿￿(ni;Ai) in (d), and {i ￿ uo
iuo
i￿1 +
￿￿(ni￿1;Ai￿1) in (e). The instruments zi are ni; Aus
i As
i and {i￿j for j = f1;2;3g in
rows (i) - (iv) respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses.
tested take the form E[uo
izixi+5￿j] = 0 for j = f1;2;:::;6g where uo
i ￿ "i + ￿o
i ￿ ￿o
i￿1 for o = fask;bidg:
These tests look for evidence of state-dependency in D(L;S) beyond that implied by functional form in
(7) and (8). Similarly, the C-tests in columns (c)-(e) look for evidence of misspeci￿cation in the error
variances. The moments being tested here take the form of E[{izi] = 0 where {i is the unexpected squared
realization of the shock in period i [i.e., {i ￿ uo
iuł
i ￿ ￿"(ni;Ai) in column (c), {i ￿ ￿
2
i ￿ ￿￿(ni;Ai) in (d),
and {i ￿ uo
iuo
i￿1 + ￿￿(ni￿1;Ai￿1) in (e)]. Row (iv) reports C-tests for 3rd order residual ARCH by testing
moment conditions of the form E[{i{i￿j] = 0 for j = f1;2;3g:
As the table shows, none of the test statistics in rows (i)-(iii) are signi￿cant at the 5 percent level. In
particular, there is no evidence from the tests in row (i) that the functional forms in (7)-(9) are unduly
restrictive. The results in rows (ii) and (iii) address the question of whether there should be a distinction in
our model between the arrival of US and German news, or scheduled and unscheduled news. Recall that the
median (daily) arrival rate for German news is four times the rate for US news. Some of this di⁄erence may
be attributable to institutional features, such as the distribution of news bureaus supplying Reuters, that
are unrelated to the pace at which price-relevant information becomes known. In particular, it is possible
that the arrival rate of German news items on the Headline screens overstates the true pace at which price-
relevant German news arrives. In this case, our speci￿cation using the Ai dummy will overstate how the
dynamics of prices and order ￿ ow change immediately following the arrival of price-relevant news. The
19C-statistics in row (ii) test for this form of misspeci￿cation using the arrival of US news as an instrument.
None of the statistics are signi￿cant at the 5 percent level. Di⁄erences between the arrival of scheduled and
unscheduled news could pose similar problems. For example, if the ratio of common-knowledge to dispersed
information in scheduled news is higher on average than in non-scheduled news, the price and order ￿ ow
dynamics following the arrival of scheduled news may di⁄er from the dynamics following the arrival of other
news. The C-statistics in row (iii) are designed to look for evidence of this form of misspeci￿cation. None
are signi￿cant at the 5 percent level.16; 17 In sum, these diagnostic tests suggest that the estimated model
adequately accounts for the e⁄ects of varying trade intensity and the arrival of news on the dynamics of
transaction prices and interdealer order ￿ ow.
The model is less successful in accounting for all the heteroskedasticity in the error processes. The C-tests
for 3rd-order residual ARCH are signi￿cant at the 5 percent level. An inspection of the estimated residuals
shows that these residual ARCH e⁄ects are concentrated at lag one. In fact, if we omit this moment from
our C-test, we cannot reject the null of no residual heteroskedasticity. We have accounted for this feature
of the data in our estimates and tests by constructing the GMM weighting matrix from the Newey West
estimator with an MA(1) serial correlation correction.18
3.1.4 News Arrival and Intraday Dynamics
We now examine how the information in macro news is transmitted to prices. For this, we use our model
estimates to compute a variance decomposition for price changes across di⁄erent market states. First, we
use our estimates to write the change in average transaction price as:
￿pi = B(L;Si)￿i + "i; (14)
where B(L;S) = D(L;S)C(L)Lm: The state-dependent coe¢ cients in B(L;S) identify how dispersed infor-
mation a⁄ects prices and can be computed from our estimates of the coe¢ cients in D(L;S) and C(L): We can
also use equation (14) to decompose the variance of price changes into di⁄erent theoretical components. In
particular, consider the k-period price change between period i￿k and i: ￿kpi ￿
P k￿1
j=0￿pi￿j. Substituting






16Since the arrival of scheduled news is, by de￿nition, exogenous to past market volatility, these results are consistent with
the absence of feedback from FX price volatility to the arrival of unscheduled news items. We also looked more directly for
evidence of feedback by estimating logit and probit models for Ai and Aus
i and Agm
i using lagged square price changes, speci￿cally
f(￿pask
i￿j)2g24
j=6, as explanatory variables. In all cases, the estimated coe¢ cients were small and statistically insigni￿cant. There
is no evidence of feedback e⁄ects in our ￿ltered series of unscheduled news items.
17Andersen, et al. (2003) found that scheduled news items generally contributed less to the within event-window variance of
spot rate returns as the month progressed, suggesting that information contained in releases towards the end of the month is
largely redundant. We could not ￿nd evidence of similar calendar-e⁄ects in our data. Speci￿cally, we computed C-statistics as
in row (iii) with As
i replaced by As
i ￿ dayi as an instrument where dayi is the day of the month in which observation i falls.
The resulting test statistics are similar to those in row (iii) of the table and none are statistically signi￿cant.
18Speci￿cally, the presence of ￿rst-order ARCH induces serial correlation in the residuals associated with conditions (10b),















Equation (16) provides a decomposition of the variance of price changes conditioned on the state of the
market during the last k periods. The ￿rst component on the right-hand side is the variance contribution
of common-knowledge shocks, the second is the contribution of dispersed information shocks operating via
order ￿ ow. Notice that state-dependency in the error variances and lag polynomial D(L;S) of our model
allows the contribution of each variance component to vary with changes in trade intensity and the arrival
of macro news. We now use the model estimates to quantify these e⁄ects.
Order ￿ ow is much more important in price determination when macro news arrives. Table 4 reports the
estimated contribution of dispersed information to the variance of price changes over horizons of 5, 30 and
60 minutes (i.e., k = f1;6;12g) when trading intensity is at four di⁄erent levels (i.e., n = f25;50;100;150g
per 5-minute interval). Row (i) in each panel reports the contribution for a given level of trade intensity in
the absence of macro news. (The statistics in parenthesis are standard errors associated with these estimates
computed from the asymptotic distribution of the GMM estimates by the ￿delta-method￿ .19) Consistent
with the results in Evans (2002), these statistics show that the contribution of dispersed information to price
variance rises with trade intensity and horizon. The contribution of dispersed information in the presence of
macro news is reported in row (ii). These statistics incorporate direct e⁄ects of news arrival via the 5 and
15 minute announcement dummies and the indirect e⁄ects via the induced change in trade intensity. We
estimate that trading intensity rises by approximately 45 trades per 5-minute interval when news arrives.20
To estimate the contribution of dispersed information we therefore use the GMM estimates of (16) with
B(L;Sa); ￿￿(Sa); and ￿"(Sa) where Sa = fn + 45;1g and n is the initial level of trade intensity shown at
the top of each panel in the table. A comparison of the statistics in rows (i) and (ii) show that following
the arrival of macro news, dispersed information contributes more to the variance of prices across all three
horizons. This pattern also appears consistently across all four panels (corresponding to di⁄erent initial
levels of trade intensity).
We conducted a Monte Carlo experiment to assess the statistical signi￿cance of these ￿ndings. The
experiment comprised the following steps: (i) draw a vector of parameter estimates ^ ￿
j
from the estimated
asymptotic distribution of the GMM estimates; N(^ ￿; ^ V￿); (ii) use (16) and ^ ￿
j
to compute the contribution
of the dispersed information shocks to the k-period price variance at trade intensity n in the absence of







given a constant level of trading intensity n, and the
presence or absence of macro news, A = f1;0g: We estimate the standard error of Rk(￿;n;A) as the square root of
rRk(^ ￿;n;A)0 ^ V rRk(^ ￿;n;A) where rRk(:) is the gradient vector w.r.t. ￿; and ^ V is the estimated covariance matrix of the
GMM estimates, ^ ￿:
20This estimate is obtained from the OLS estimate of ￿ from the regression: ni = ￿Ai +
P
￿idumi;￿ + ui where dumi;￿ is a
￿seasonal￿time dummy that takes the value of one when observation i falls in the ￿0th 30-minute window of a day. We estimate
￿ to be 44.55 with a standard error of 3.10.
21news (A = ￿ A = 0); Rk(^ ￿
j
;n;0) for horizons of 5, 30 and 60 minutes (i.e., k = f1;6;12g), (iii) use (16)
and ^ ￿
j
to compute the contribution to k-period price variance with news (A = ￿ A = 1) at trade intensity
na = n+45; Rk(^ ￿
j
;na;1) for k = f1;6;12g; and (iv) repeat steps (i) - (iii) 5000 times for n = f25;50;100;150g
and compute the fraction of times that Rk(^ ￿
j
;n;0) ￿ Rk(^ ￿
j
;na;1): This procedure gives us a Monte Carlo
estimate of the p-value for the null hypothesis that news arrival does not increase the contribution of dispersed
news to the variance of prices. Cases where the p-values are less than 10, 5 and 1 percent are indicated
in Table 4 by ￿￿￿ , ￿￿￿￿ , and ￿￿￿￿￿respectively . Based on these calculations, the increased contribution of
dispersed information shocks following the arrival of macro news is strongly signi￿cant over most horizons
and initial trading intensities.
Table 4: Variance Decomposition
Horizon (minutes) Horizon (minutes)
5 30 60 5 30 60
trade intensity: n = 25 trade intensity: n = 50
(i) No News 0.631 0.989 0.758 1.436 2.314 2.118
(1.040) (2.811) (3.754) (1.327) (2.911) (3.621)
(ii) News 3.895￿￿ 10.280￿￿ 11.768￿ 5.123￿￿ 12.137￿￿ 13.597￿￿
(0.911) (3.396) (4.236) (1.354) (4.554) (5.451)
(iii) Scheduled News 8.271￿￿￿ 16.083￿￿ 17.417￿ 9.868￿￿￿ 17.807￿￿ 19.067￿￿
(2.896) (8.020) (9.112) (3.748) (9.569) (10.727)
trade intensity: n = 100 trade intensity: n = 150
(i) No News 3.808 7.475 7.957 7.173 14.862 16.129
(1.359) (2.850) (3.303) (1.738) (3.747) (4.131)
(ii) News 7.981￿￿ 15.754￿ 17.101￿ 11.214￿￿ 19.163 20.358
(2.755) (7.658) (8.729) (4.500) (10.673) (11.862)
(iii) Scheduled News 13.231￿￿￿ 21.067￿ 22.163￿ 16.679￿￿ 24.053 24.980
(5.533) (12.326) (13.573) (7.248) (14.569) (15.871)
Notes: The table reports values for Rk(￿;n;A); the contribution of dispersed information shocks
to variance of k-horizon price changes implied by the GMM estimates of the intraday model given a
constant level of trading intensity n, and the presence or absence of macro news, A = f1;0g:
Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistics in rows (i) - (iii) are computed as Rk(￿;n;0);
Rk(￿;n + 45;1) and Rk(￿;n + 65;1) respectively. Cases where the Monte Carlo p-value for
the null that news arrival does not increase the contribution of dispersed news to the variance of
prices is less than 10, 5 and 1 percent are indicated by ￿￿￿ , ￿￿￿￿ , and ￿￿￿￿￿respectively.
The speci￿cation tests reported in Table 3 do not suggest that the direct a⁄ects of macro news arrival vary
according to whether or not the news item is scheduled. Nevertheless, scheduled news may have a di⁄erent
total impact because the induced trade intensity di⁄ers from the trade intensity induced by non-scheduled
news. We estimate that trading intensity when scheduled US news arrives rises by approximately 65 trades
per 5-minute interval. Row (iii) of Table 4 shows the contribution of dispersed information in the presence
of a scheduled news announcement that increases trade intensity by this amount. Because the price-impact
22of order ￿ ow increase with trading intensity, the estimated variance contribution of dispersed information
is larger following the arrival of scheduled news than it is for the more prevalent non-scheduled items. The
p-values computed from Monte Carlo experiments with na = n + 65 indicate an even stronger pattern of
statistical signi￿cance.
Overall, our estimates indicate that order ￿ ow contributes more to price adjustment following macro news
than at other times. This is not what one would expect if macro news is primarily comprised of common-
kowledge information that is directly impounded into FX prices. If macro news primarily transmits new
common-knowledge information, order ￿ ow should contribute less to price-dynamics in the period following
the arrival of news than at other times. By contrast, the results in Table 4 strongly suggest that the arrival
of macro news triggers trading that reveals new dispersed information that a⁄ects prices indirectly. One
particularly interesting aspect of our ￿ndings concerns the e⁄ects of scheduled US announcements. Since
these news items contain data releases on macro economic aggregates, one might have expected that they
contain a greater proportion of common-knowledge to dispersed information than some of the other news
items in our sample. That order ￿ ow is at least as important in price dynamics following scheduled news
suggests that this common view concerning the information content of macro news is incorrect.
4 Daily Analysis
Our intraday analysis shows the importance of the order ￿ ow channel as a means for impounding macro
news in FX prices. We now examine implications of this for the behavior of FX prices at the daily frequency.
This examination compliments our intraday analysis for three reasons. First, daily changes in FX prices are
very nearly a martingale (which is not true of ￿ve-minute changes). Our daily model thus sheds light on
how the information contained in macro news contributes to price variation over the longer run. Second,
our daily analysis provides additional perspective on results relating daily price dynamics to order ￿ ow (e.g.,
Evans and Lyons 2002a). In particular, our estimates provide a breakdown of the sources of price and order
￿ ow volatility. Third, our daily analysis provides a robustness check on the results presented above. For
example, we can construct measures of the daily ￿ ow of macro news in ways that were not possible at higher
frequencies. The consistency of the results derived from estimates of the daily and intraday model shows
that our main ￿ndings are robust to our methods for identifying the impact of macro news arrivals.
4.1 The Model
Our daily model for price and order ￿ ow dynamics comprises the following equations:
￿pt = ￿xt + et + vt; (17)
xt = ut + wt; (18)
23where ￿pt is the change in the spot price of FX between 5:00 pm on day t ￿ 1 and 5:00 pm on day t and
xt is interdealer order ￿ ow realized over the same period. The parameter ￿ captures the price impact of
order ￿ ow at the daily horizon, i.e., it re￿ ects information content. Prices and order ￿ ow are subject to
four shocks representing di⁄erent sources of information hitting the market: et;vt;ut; and wt. These shocks
are mean zero, serially uncorrelated and mutually independent conditional on the day-t state of the market:
The et and vt shocks represent information that is impounded in price directly. et is the common knowledge
e⁄ect of macro news arrivals on the price of FX. vt represents other factors directly impounded in prices,
i.e., factors unrelated to both order ￿ ow or macro news events (possibly noise). Order ￿ ow is driven by
the ut and wt shocks. The ut shocks represent order ￿ ow e⁄ects from macro news arrivals ￿the dispersed
information e⁄ect of the news. Shocks to order ￿ ow that are unrelated to macro news are represented by
the wt shocks (e.g., portfolio shifts arising from other sources such as changing risk tolerances or hedging).
We identify the e⁄ects of the news-related common-knowledge and dispersed-information shocks, et and
ut; through state-dependency of price changes and order ￿ ow in the second moments. Speci￿cally, we assume
that the variance of et and ut on day t is increasing in the daily ￿ ow of macro news, which we measure by
the number of US and German news arrivals between 5:00 pm on days t ￿ 1 and t, Aus
t and Ag
t:
V art (et) = ￿2
e(Aus
t ;Ag





{(0;0) = 0, with @￿2
{=@Ak
t > 0 for { = fe;ug and k = fus,gg: Thus, on days without news,
et = ut = 0; so price changes and order ￿ ow are driven solely by the vt and wt shocks. These shocks are
independent of news, so their variances are unrelated to Ak
t. As we shall see, there is little evidence of
state-dependency in the second moments of daily price changes and order ￿ ow beyond the e⁄ects of news. In
particular, unlike our intraday model, there is no need to incorporate trade intensity as an additional state
variable. We therefore assume that the conditional variances of the vt and wt shocks are constant:
V art (vt) = ￿2
v; and V art (wt) = ￿2
w: (20)
Several features of our daily model deserve comment. First, our speci￿cation abstracts from the complex
intraday dynamics of prices and order ￿ ow. Equations in (17) and (18) imply that by 5:00 pm GMT each
day, FX prices fully re￿ ect the information contained in order ￿ ow to that point. As a result, price change
over the next 24 hours (i.e. ￿pt+1) are not correlated with order ￿ ow from the past 24 hours (i.e., xt): This
feature of our model is supported by the data. We show below that there is no correlation between ￿pt+1
and xt. Our speci￿cation also implies the absence of serial correlation in daily price changes and order ￿ ows.
This too is consistent with the evidence reported in Section 2. A second feature of our speci￿cation concerns
the price-impact parameter ￿: Our intraday analysis showed that the price impact of order ￿ ows varied
with trade intensity and the arrival of news. This form of state-dependency in the intraday data does not
appear at the daily frequency (addressed below), so we do not allow for state-dependency in ￿: We would
24add that this restriction in our model means that our test of the relative importance of indirect e⁄ects is
conservative: order ￿ ow induced by news may have more price impact than the constrained equation gives
it credit for. In any event, we do incorporate state-dependency into the error variances. This ￿nal feature is
key to identifying the e⁄ects of macro news, so let us focus on it more closely.
Identi￿cation of the e⁄ects of macro news is achieved by the assumption that the variance of the et and
ut shocks is higher on days when there are a greater number of news items appearing on the Reuters Money
Market News screen. Crucially, this assumption does not require that FX market participants view the
information in each news item as equally important (which the market does not). The identifying power of
this assumption does, however, depend on the absence of wild variations in the quality of Reuters￿editorial
judgements. For example, if the Reuters screen were ￿ ooded one day with reports containing essentially
no information, but on another a few reports appeared with great economic signi￿cance, daily variations
in the number of news reports would be a poor measure of the daily ￿ ow of macro news. Based on our
understanding of Reuters￿editorial process, this possibility seems far-fetched. That said, we recognize that
no single measure will identify the daily variation in macro news ￿ ow with complete precision. Thus, in
addition to measures based on the daily arrival rates for US and German news shown in (19), we will also
use a measure based on the subset of items that are scheduled.
4.2 Estimation
We estimate two versions of the model by the Generalized Method of Moments. Version I assumes that




t: Under this speci￿cation, the ￿ ow of macro news is identi￿ed by the arrival rate of both US
and German news. We also allow for the possibility that daily variations in the ￿ ow of macro news may be
re￿ ected di⁄erently in the arrival rates for US and German news. Version II of our model allows the variance
of et and ut on day t to depend on the number of US and German news items separately. The variance

















{ are positive parameters for { = fe;ug: Thus, the parameters to be estimated are
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ug in Version II.
The GMM estimates of the model parameter are derived from the following set of moment conditions:
0 = E [(￿pt ￿ ￿xt)xt] (22a)
0 = E [fVt (￿pt) ￿ V art (￿pt)g ￿ Zt]; (22b)
0 = E [fVt (xt) ￿ V art (xt)g ￿ Zt]; (22c)
25where Zt is a vector of instruments. Condition (22a) follows from the assumed orthogonality between the
shocks to prices (et and vt) and the shocks to order ￿ ow (ut and wt): Conditions (22b) and (22c) combine
the second moments of price changes and order ￿ ow implied by the model with measures of the variance of
order ￿ ow, V (xt), the variance of price changes, V (￿pt): These measures are computed for each day in our










where the subscript ￿it￿ denotes the i0th 5-minute observation on day t; and Tt denotes the number of
observations with consecutive trading. Vt (￿pt) and Vt (xt) are the (uncentered) second moments of the
price change and order ￿ ow process over day t, scaled by the number of 5-minute intraday observations.
Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Labys (2001) show that these measures are consistent nonparametric
estimates of the actual moments under mild regularity conditions. They also note that while the measures
will be biased when prices changes and order ￿ ow do not follow Martingales in the continuous time limit,
in practice these biases will be very small if a large number of high frequency observations are used to
compute each daily measure. This appears true in our data where the average value of Tt is 188. Estimates
of Vt (￿pt); and Vt (xt) computed from ￿pit and xit are almost identical to their counterparts using the
estimated residuals from the price and order ￿ ow equations of the intraday model: the correlation between
the alternative measures is greater than 0.99 for both order ￿ ow and price changes:
We use two sets of instruments to implement estimation. The instrument vector in Version I comprises
a constant and sum of the US and German news items, Aall
t : In Version II, we use a constant, Aus
t and Ag
t
as instruments. These choices imply that the number of moment conditions in (22) equals the number of
parameters, so the estimates come from exactly identi￿ed versions of the model. As above, we apply the
standard 2-step method to compute the GMM estimates (without the serial correlation correction in the
weighting matrix). We will also consider the adequacy of our model estimates with a set of diagnostic tests
based on additional moment conditions.
In our intraday analysis there are over 11,000 time series observations from which to compute the sample
moments in the GMM objective function in equation (12). Here we have just 80 trading days of data from
which to compute estimates of the daily model. Consequently, the GMM asymptotic distribution may be
a poor approximation to the ￿nite-sample distribution of the parameter estimates. We conducted a Monte
Carlo experiment to investigate this possibility. Speci￿cally, taking the GMM estimates of each version of our
daily model, ^ ￿ (reported Table 5), we generated 5000 samples of 80 daily observations on ￿pt; xt; Vt (￿pt)
and Vt (xt) using the actual news data:21 The GMM estimates of the model were then computed from each
sample to compile a Monte Carlo distribution f~ ￿jg5000
j=1 . We found that GMM estimates ^ ￿ are very similar
21For the purpose of these calculations we assumed that daily shocks comprise T = 180 independent 5-minute shocks, i.e.,
￿t =
PT
i=1 ￿it for ￿ = fe;v;u;wg with ￿it ￿ i.i.d.N(0;T￿2V art(￿t)) for each day t. We then use (23) to compute Vt (￿pt)
and Vt (xt) with xit = uit + wit and ￿pit = ￿xit + eit + vit:
26to the mean of the Monte Carlo distributions for both versions of our model. The largest di⁄erence was just
1.6 percent. There are much larger di⁄erences in the estimated standard errors. The estimated asymptotic
standard errors are on average 2.5 times larger than the standard errors computed from the Monte Carlo
distribution in Version I of the model and 2.7 times larger in Version II. Based on these ￿ndings, it seems
likely that estimated asymptotic standard errors overstate the true standard errors. Below we take the
conservative approach of reporting the asymptotic standard errors.
4.2.1 Daily Estimates
Panel A of Table 5 reports parameter estimates from both versions of the model with exact identi￿cation.
Asymptotic standard errors allowing for residual heteroskedasticity are shown in parentheses. In both spec-
i￿cations the estimate of the price-impact parameter ￿ is positive, as the theory predicts, and statistically
signi￿cant. (Its size corresponds to a price impact of roughly 50 basis points per $1 billion in order ￿ ow.) In
Version I of the model, both variance parameters ￿e and ￿u are positive and signi￿cant at the ￿ve percent
level. These estimates imply that both direct and indirect e⁄ects of news on price are present. This ￿nding
is con￿rmed by the estimates from Version II reported in the right-hand panel. When US and German news
events are introduced separately, the estimates of ￿us
e ; ￿g
e, ￿us
u , and ￿g
u are all positive and signi￿cant at
the ￿ve percent level. Furthermore, as panel B shows, Wald statistics for the null that ￿us
e = ￿us
u = 0; and
￿us
u = ￿g
u = 0, are highly signi￿cant. Panel B also shows that there is no signi￿cant evidence against the





To provide additional support for our speci￿cation, panel C shows results of diagnostic tests that ex-
amine an expanded set of moment conditions. In row (i) we report the J-statistic for speci￿cations using
(22) and E [(￿pt ￿ ￿xt)xt￿1] = 0 as moment conditions.22 Our model should satisfy this additional con-
dition because all the price impact of order ￿ ow occurs within the day. As the table shows, there is no
signi￿cant evidence to reject this set of restrictions in either version of the model. The statistics in row (ii)
test for the presence of (residual) serial correlation in the price change and order ￿ ow process by respec-
tively adding E [(￿pt ￿ ￿xt)(￿pt￿1 ￿ ￿xt￿1)] = 0 and E [xtxt￿1] = 0 to the conditions in (22). Again,
consistent with the assumed structure of out model, none of the J-statistics are statistically signi￿cant.
Next, we turn to the issue of state-dependency. Our daily model assumes that trade intensity and news
have no e⁄ect on ￿; the parameter identifying the price-impact of order ￿ ow. We examine this restric-
tion by adding E [(￿pt ￿ ￿xt) ￿ zt] = 0 to the conditions in (22) for zt = fxtnt;xtAall
t g in Version I and
zt = fxtnt;xtAus
t ;xtAg
tg in Version II, where nt denotes trading intensity on day t: As the table shows, nei-
ther of the associated J￿statistics are signi￿cant. We also check for additional state-dependency in the error
variances. In this case we add E [fVt (￿pt) ￿ V art (￿pt)gnt] = 0 and E [fVt (xt) ￿ V art (xt)gnt] = 0 to the
conditions in (22). These additional moments examine whether the residual variance in price and order ￿ ow,
22The J-statistics reported here are equivalent to the C-statistics used in our intraday analysis because both versions of the
daily model are exactly identi￿ed without the additional moment conditions.
27Table 5: GMM Estimates of Daily Models
A: Parameters Version I Version II
Estimate Std. Err Estimate Std. Err
￿ 0.032 (0.003) 0.032 (0.003)
￿2
w 67.231 (11.395) 67.018 (11.282)
￿2











B: Wald Tests Statistic p-value
￿us
e = ￿us
u = 0 33.303 (0.000)
￿us
u = ￿g






C: Diagnostic Tests Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
i) Lagged order ￿ ow 2.502 (0.114) 2.502 (0.114)
ii) Serial correlation:
￿pt eqn. 0.014 (0.905) 0.014 (0.905)
xt eqn. 0.190 (0.663) 0.190 (0.663)
iii) State-dependency:
￿ 2.767 (0.251) 2.767 (0.251)
Var(￿pt) & Var(xt) 2.479 (0.290) 2.527 (0.283)
iv) Residual Arch:
￿pt eqn. 0.348 (0.555) 0.281 (0.596)
xt eqn. 2.332 (0.127) 2.486 (0.115)
v) Joint Test 10.097 (0.343) 9.876 (0.361)
Notes: Panel A of the table reports GMM parameter estimates and asymptotic standard
errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity) in parentheses. Panel B shows Wald tests for
the coe¢ cient restrictions listed on the left with asymptotic p-values reported in paren-
theses. The J￿tests shown in panel C test the moment restrictions in (22) and the
following: (i) E [(￿pt ￿ ￿xt)xt￿1] = 0, (ii) E [(￿pt ￿ ￿xt)(￿pt￿1 ￿ ￿xt￿1)] = 0;
E [xtxt￿1] = 0, (iii) E [(￿pt ￿ ￿xt) ￿ zt] = 0; E [fVt (￿pt) ￿ V art (￿pt)gnt] = 0;
and E [fVt (xt) ￿ V art (xt)gnt] = 0, where zt = fxtnt;xtAall
t g in Version I and zt =
fxtnt;xtAus
t ;xtAg
tg in Version II, (iv) E[fVt (￿pt) ￿ V art (￿pt)g fVt￿1 (￿pt￿1) ￿
V art￿1 (￿pt￿1)g] = 0 and E[fVt (xt) ￿ V art (xt)gfVt￿1 (xt￿1) ￿ V art￿1 (xt￿1)g] =
0; and (v) all the moments listed in (i) - (iv). Asymptotic p-values are reported in paren-
theses.
28unaccounted for by the arrival of news, is correlated with daily trade intensity. Once again, neither of the
J-statistics is signi￿cant. There is no evidence that trade intensity should be present as a second state vari-
able governing the error variances. Further evidence on the speci￿cation of the error variances is provided by
the statistics in row (iv). Here we test for residual ￿rst order ARCH by adding E[fVt (￿pt) ￿ V art (￿pt)g
fVt￿1 (￿pt￿1) ￿ V art￿1 (￿pt￿1)g] = 0 and E[fVt (xt) ￿ V art (xt)gfVt￿1 (xt￿1) ￿ V art￿1 (xt￿1)g] = 0 to
the conditions in (22). These speci￿cation tests also show no evidence of signi￿cant misspeci￿cation in the
error variances.23 Finally, in row (v), we report J￿statistics for models using (22) and all the additional
moments. These moment conditions respectively provide 9 and 11 over-identifying restrictions in Versions I
and II of the model. As the table shows, neither J￿statistic is signi￿cant at the 5 percent level. The para-
meter estimates obtained in this manner are very similar to those reported in Panel A. Since the estimated
standard errors are a little smaller (as one would expect), the overall pattern of statistical signi￿cance we
report appears robust to the number of over-identifying restrictions used in estimation. Importantly this
level of robustness is also re￿ ected in the model-based statistics we consider next.
4.3 News Arrival and Daily Dynamics
Our intraday analysis showed that dispersed information contributes more to the variance of price changes
following macro news announcements than at other times. Our daily model allows us to address a distinct
but equally important issue: the extent to which macro news is impounded in prices directly, via the common
knowledge et shocks, or indirectly via the dispersed information ut shocks that a⁄ect prices via order ￿ ow.
To clarify this issue within the context of our daily model, consider the unconditional variance of price
changes implied by our model, V ar(￿pt). By de￿nition, this variance can be written as E [V art (￿pt)] +
V ar(Et￿pt) where Et￿pt and V art(￿pt) denote the ￿rst and second moments of price changes conditioned
on the day t state of the market: According to our model, the number of news arrivals has no implication
for the direction of how prices will change, so Et￿pt = 0: With the aid of equation (17), we can therefore
write the unconditional variance as:
V ar(￿pt) = ￿2E [V art (xt)] + E [V art (et + vt)]:
The ￿rst term on the right identi￿es the contribution of order ￿ ow volatility to the variance of price changes.
The second term identi￿es the contribution of information that is directly impounded into prices. Using
23An earlier version of this paper examined two further aspects of the model. We looked for evidence of nonlinearity in
the error-variance speci￿cations shown in (21) by regressing Vt (￿pt) and Vt (xt) on a constant, Aus
t ; Ag
t; (Aus
t )2, and (Ag
t)2:
Since the price and order ￿ow variances are linear functions of the error variances, nonlinearity in the latter should appear
in the form of non-zero coe¢ cients on (Aus
t )2 and (Ag
t)2 in these regressions. Our estimates of these coe¢ cients were not
statistically signi￿cant. We also explored whether temporal aggregation could a⁄ect our results by introducing a feedback from
price changes to order ￿ow. Model estimates incorporating this feedback e⁄ect were similar to those reported here, and had
the same implications concerning the e⁄ects of macro news.
29equations (18)-(20) to substitute for V art (xt) and V art (et + vt); we obtain:

















Equation (24) decomposes the unconditional variance of daily price changes into four components. The
￿rst term identi￿es the contribution of common-knowledge shocks associated with the arrival of news. We
refer to this as the direct channel. The second term represents the contribution of dispersed information
shocks associated with news. Notice that this term includes the price-impact coe¢ cient ￿; because dispersed
information a⁄ects prices via order ￿ ow. We refer to this as the indirect channel. The third and fourth terms
identify the contribution of shocks that are not associated with the arrival of news; information embedded
in the vt and wt shocks a⁄ects price via the direct and indirect channels respectively.
Table 6 reports elements of the variance decomposition in (24) derived from the estimates of the daily













t) for { = fe;ug): We also report standard errors computed by the ￿delta-
method￿from the estimated asymptotic distribution of the model estimates. The statistics shown in Panel
A use the parameters estimated from the exactly identi￿ed models reported in panel A of Table 5. As noted
above, these statistics are very similar to those based on the estimates derived from Versions I and II of the
model with 9 and 11 over-identifying restrictions.
The upper rows in panel A of Table 6 report the contribution of dispersed and common knowledge
information shocks to the unconditional variance of prices. The statistics in row (i) report the frac-




t)]=V ar(￿pt). Estimates from both versions of the model indicate that the direct e⁄ect of
news arrivals account for approximately 14 percent of the variance of total price changes. The estimates
from Version II of the model indicate that this total is split roughly 2 to 1 between German and US news.
Since German news arrives at four times the daily rate of US news on average, these estimates suggest
that a typical US news item has a somewhat larger direct e⁄ect on prices than a German item. Row (ii)




These statistics show that the indirect e⁄ects of news arrival account for roughly 22 percent of the vari-
ance. Once again, the arrival of German news contributes more than twice as much as US news through
this channel. Row (iii) shows the total contribution of news to the variance of prices via both channels
is approximately 36 percent. These estimates are an order of magnitude larger than those found in event







t)]: As the table shows, the contribution of news via the indirect channel is
roughly 60 percent larger than the contribution via the direct channel. These estimates clearly indicate that
the indirect e⁄ects of news operating via order ￿ ow are an important component of price dynamics.
As a robustness check on these ￿ndings, we also estimated Versions I and II of our model using scheduled
news. For this purpose we ￿rst computed the standardized forecast error for each of the 28 US and 12 German
30Table 6: Daily Price Variance Decompositions
A: All News Version I Version II
Combined US German Combined
i) Direct 0.139 0.036 0.104 0.140
(0.046) (0.042) (0.017) (0.046)
ii) Indirect 0.224 0.060 0.166 0.226
(0.078) (0.033) (0.070) (0.078)
iii) Total 0.364 0.096 0.270 0.366
(0.092) (0.040) (0.088) (0.091)
iv) Ratio(Indirect/Direct) 1.612 1.642 1.602 1.612
(0.763) (1.069) (0.857) (0.761)
B: Scheduled News Version I Version II
Combined US German Combined
i) Direct 0.097 0.068 0.030 0.098
(0.034) (0.030) (0.021) (0.034)
ii) Indirect 0.109 0.064 0.043 0.107
(0.070) (0.056) (0.040) (0.069)
iii) Total 0.206 0.132 0.073 0.204
(0.076) (0.074) (0.049) (0.077)
iv) Ratio(Indirect/Direct) 1.128 0.931 1.466 1.092
(0.843) (0.748) (1.503) (0.801)
Notes: The table reports elements of the variance decomposition for price changes






u(At)])=V ar(￿pt) and ￿2E[￿2
u(At)]=E[￿2
e(At)]: Under the Version I
heading, the estimates use At = Aall
t : Under the US, German and Combined
headings of Version II, At equals Aus
t ; Ag
t and Aall
t : Panel B reports estimates us-
ing the absolute, standardized forecast error for scheduled news. Standard errors,
computed from the estimated asymptotic distribution of the GMM estimates, are
reported in parentheses.












t is the value for variable j announced
on day t and A
j
t is the median forecast of A
j
t from a survey of professional business economist conducted by





1993 to December 1999. Our four month sample on prices and order ￿ ows is too short to study the impact
of individual scheduled announcements so we compute measures of news arrival by aggregating the absolute
values of E
j





t j for all country x=fUS,Gg variables
31j announced on day t:24 According to these measures, a scheduled announcement need not constitute new
information to market participants. If a prior consensus existed (at the time of the MMS survey) about the
announced value for item j on day t; E
j
t equals zero, so the announcement will not contribute to our measure
of news ￿ ow, Ax
t:
Panel B of Table 6 reports the variance decompositions implied by estimates of the daily model using
Aus
t and Ag
t computed from scheduled news. Three sets of results stand out. First, our estimates from both
versions of the model imply that scheduled news accounts for approximated 20 percent of the unconditional
variance of daily price changes. These estimates are two thirds the size of their counterparts based on the
full spectrum of news in panel A, but they are much larger than the contribution implied by event studies.
Second, the contribution of scheduled news to price volatility appears more equally balanced between the
direct and indirect channels than is the case of all news: the combined ratios in row (iv) are close to unity.
The third noteworthy feature concerns the di⁄erence between the e⁄ects of scheduled US and German news.
Approximately 2/3 of the variance in daily price changes due to scheduled announcements can be attributed
to US items and 1/3 to German items. This 2:1 ratio roughly matches the ratio of US to German scheduled
announcements (153:74) in our sample. Our estimates also indicate that German announcements operate
more via the indirect than the direct channel whereas US announcements impact prices equally via both
channels.
To summarize, the results in Table 6 show that both scheduled and non-scheduled news contribute to the
variance of the price changes in our sample. Our results also indicate that news items generally contain both
common-knowledge information that is directly re￿ ected in prices, and dispersed information that indirectly
a⁄ects prices via its impact on order ￿ ow.
5 Conclusion
This paper extends past work on FX prices and public news in three main ways. We address the presence
of an indirect channel through which public news a⁄ects prices. Second, we use heteroskedasticity in order
￿ ow and price for identi￿cation, ￿ la Rigobon and Sack (2004), rather than the more common event-study
approach. Third, our methodology exploits the full set of macro news events piped into FX trading desks.
Our analysis of intraday data shows that order ￿ ow contributes more to changing FX prices in the period
immediately following the arrival of news than at other times. This evidence pointing to the importance of
the indirect channel is supported by our daily analysis: roughly two-thirds of the e⁄ect of macro news on FX
prices is transmitted via order ￿ ow, the remainder being the direct e⁄ect of news. With both the direct and
indirect channels operating, we estimate that macro news accounts for 36 percent of total FX price variance
in daily data. Given that daily prices are very nearly a martingale, this ￿nding implies that macro news is
24Love and Payne (2004) construct a similar aggregate measure except that they ￿sign￿each forecast error according to the
direction of its theoretically predicted exchange rate e⁄ect. The latter adjustment is unnecessary here because our aim is to
identify changes in the ￿ow of macro news rather than to identify the directional in￿uence of scheduled news on FX prices.
32far larger contributor to longer term price variation than previously thought.
Our daily results speak directly to the question, What drives order ￿ ow? The analysis in Evans and
Lyons (2002a) splits total daily DM/$ price variation into two parts: about 60 percent is due to order ￿ ow
and about 40 percent is due to other factors. The results in Table 6 shed light on both of these parts. They
suggest that order ￿ ow￿ s 60 percent breaks roughly into one-third (20 percent) that is induced by macro
news and two-thirds (40 percent) that is not news induced. Put di⁄erently, macro news accounts for about
one-third of the variance of interdealer order ￿ ow in our sample. The 40 percent of total price variation due
to other factors breaks into about one-third (15 percent) from the direct e⁄ect of macro news and two-thirds
(25 percent) that remains unaccounted for.
Finally, let us o⁄er a wider perspective on our results. Inherent in current macro models is the view that
price-setting dealers observe macro news, calculate the price implication, and instantly adjust all their FX
prices by the same amount. Our results suggest that this is over-simpli￿ed. Rather, they suggest a model
in which dealers observe macro news but have little idea how to interpret it, or how the rest of the market
will interpret it. Instead, they wait to observe the trades induced and set their prices and expectations
based on the interpretations embedded therein. (This view is consistent with the ￿ndings of Evans and
Lyons 2005 that FX order ￿ ow conveys information useful for forecasting macro variables.) Models with this
richer informational structure may o⁄er new insights into many of the long-standing puzzles concerning the
behavior of FX prices.
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